China has intensified non-kinetic operations in the Luzon Strait, shifting from routine patrols to sustained electronic warfare (EW). The centerpiece is the Y-9LG, a long-range standoff jammer designed to suppress radars and communications from outside defended airspace.

• Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessels have documented repeated Starlink and GPS interference near Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) during 2024-2025 patrols.
• On April 19, 2024, Beijing dissolved the Strategic Support Force, creating a dedicated Information Support Force to integrate EW, cyber, and space operations.
• Panay Island in the central Philippines has renewed strategic value as a rear staging area, building on its WWII role, anchored by Camp Peralta (3ID) and regular Balikatan and Kasangga exercises.
• Estancia, Iloilo — population 54,882, known as the "Alaska of the Philippines" for its fish port — broke ground on a PHP5 million municipal resilience hub on August 31, 2023, but retains gaps in communications redundancy and coastal shelter capacity.

Overall risk to civilians remains low for direct conflict, but increased EW activity raises the likelihood of temporary disruptions to GPS, marine AIS, and satellite internet for fishers and coastal communities.

The Luzon Strait (~250 km between southern Taiwan and northern Luzon) and the Bashi Channel are the PLA's primary corridor to the western Pacific. Since 2020, daily PLA Air Force and Navy sorties transit the area.

• Shift in 2023–2025: From simple transits to deliberate electromagnetic probing — mapping Philippine and Taiwanese radar frequencies, response times, and communications nodes in northern Luzon (Basco, Burgos, Laoag).
• Objective: Create a recognized electromagnetic picture to enable "blind first, then strike" doctrine in a Taiwan contingency, while testing Philippine sensors without firing a shot.
• Impact: Intermittent radar clutter, VHF/UHF degradation, and GPS anomalies reported by civilian aircraft and fishers in Batanes and Cagayan.

• Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal), 2024: PCG BRP Teresa Magbanua and BRP Sindangan reported repeated Starlink service drops (10–45 minutes) and VHF radio washout while operating 12–20 nautical miles from China Coast Guard vessels. PCG described the pattern as "directional, not weather-related."
• GPS/AIS spoofing, Zambales-Pangasinan: From February to June 2024, Filipino fishers reported GPS positions jumping 5–15 nautical miles inland and AIS tracks disappearing. BFAR advisories noted similar incidents coinciding with CCG presence.
• May 2025 incident: During a resupply rotation, PCG documented a 46-minute loss of broadband and degraded Inmarsat comms while shadowed by CCG-3302, consistent with targeted EW rather than broad-spectrum jamming.

These events align with PLA doctrine of graduated escalation: using reversible, non-lethal EW to harass, delay, and impose operational costs without kinetic action.

On April 19, 2024, President Xi Jinping dissolved the Strategic Support Force (SSF), created in 2015.

It was replaced by three coequal arms under the Central Military Commission:

1. Aerospace Force – space operations
2. Cyberspace Force – network attack/defense
3. Information Support Force (ISF) – integrates communications, EW, and battlefield networking

The ISF now directly controls brigade-level EW units, including Y-9LG formations. The change shortens command chains, enabling faster coordination between jammers, drones, satellites, and naval EW ships in the South China Sea and Luzon Strait.

• Geography: Central Philippines anchor controlling access to the Sibuyan Sea, Guimaras Strait, Sulu Sea, and western approaches to the Visayas.
• History: Major WWII staging base for the 1945 liberation of Panay and subsequent operations; retains deep-water ports and dispersed airfields.
• Current role: Serves as a resilient rear area less exposed than northern Luzon, suitable for logistics, force dispersal, medical staging, and civilian evacuation support.
• Infrastructure: Iloilo International Airport (2,500m runway), Port of Iloilo, Dumangas RoRo, and northern ports in Estancia and Culasi.
• Exercises: Host for Balikatan 2023–2025 (coastal defense, HADR) and Philippine-US Kasangga exercises in Antique and Capiz focusing on territorial defense.

• Camp General Macario Peralta Jr., Jamindan, Capiz: Headquarters, Philippine Army 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) "Spearhead Troopers," covering all of Western Visayas and Negros.
• Structure: 301st Infantry Brigade (Panay), 302nd and 303rd Brigades (Negros Island).
• Joint activity: Regular Balikatan HADR and counter-landing drills; Kasangga 2024 focused on integrated coastal surveillance in Antique.
• Maritime: Philippine Navy Naval Forces Central maintains a detachment in Estancia; PCG Station Northern Iloilo operates from the fish port for SAR and fisheries protection.

Panay-wide vulnerability assessments (OCD Region VI, UPRI) identify persistent gaps relevant to both natural hazards and grey-zone interference:

• Communications: Over-reliance on commercial cellular and Starlink; limited municipal HF/VHF backup nets for barangays.
• Power: No islanded microgrids at the Estancia Fish Port or hospitals; single-point grid failures common during typhoons.
• Shelter: Insufficient storm-surge evacuation centers for coastal municipalities of Estancia, Carles, and Concepcion.
• Public awareness: No community education on recognizing GPS jamming, AIS spoofing, or reporting communications anomalies.
• Economic exposure: Fisheries-dependent livelihoods are vulnerable to extended maritime exclusion or navigation disruption.

Calm assessment: Current EW activity does not indicate imminent conflict in Panay, but it increases the chance of temporary, reversible disruptions.